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BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY IN MEXICO: 
AN ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL FOR REFORM* 
 
Christopher A Riley* 
Paola Ruelas** 
 
Abstract: The lack of gender diversity on companies’ boards has become a matter of global 
concern in recent years.  In many countries, this concern has been matched by robust action 
to increase the number of women directors.  Other countries, however, have fared rather less 
well.  Mexico exemplifies the latter group, as well as many of the reasons why progress 
towards greater diversity has often been slow in such countries.  This article explains why 
we should care about a lack of gender diversity, and why these reasons for caring apply to 
countries such as Mexico, notwithstanding their distinctive social structures and corporate 
landscapes.  It examines a number of comparator countries where greater progress has been 
achieved, and proposes a strategy for increasing the number of women directors.   
Keywords: Corporate governance; company law; Mexico; board gender diversity. 
 
I Introduction 
Globally, it has been estimated that about 16.9% of company directors are women.1  This 
figure, however, hides large variations between different countries and continents.  Whilst 
many European, Australasian, North American and some African countries have higher, and 
steadily improving, levels of female board membership, many Asian and Latin American 
countries fare much less well.  
Mexico illustrates this pattern.  With women occupying around 6.5% of board seats,2 
it has one of the lowest rates of female board membership even within Latin America.  
Perhaps still worse than the lack of female directors is the lack of any concerted national 
effort to improve matters.  As Deloitte’s global survey of board diversity observes, ‘[t]here 
                                                     
* Associate Professor, Durham Law School. 
** LLM, Durham Law School. 
We would like to thank Clare McGlynn, the anonymous referees and the editor for helpful comments.  
The usual disclaimer applies.  
1 See Deloitte, Women in the boardroom: A global perspective (6th Ed. 2019) (hereafter ‘Deloitte WB’) 
p.8.  The 5th edition (2017) of the same publication recorded a figure of approximately 15% (p.3). 
2 Ibid, p.11. See also OECD, OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2019 
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/corporate-governance-factbook.htm Table 4.17, which suggests that 
women comprised 7.5% of Mexican board positions at 2017.   
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are no current national or government initiatives to increase the number of women serving 
on corporate boards’.3   
 The experience of other countries suggests that improvements can be secured, 
however, and surprisingly quickly.  We argue that they can be achieved for Mexico too.  We 
suggest a mix of both ‘process’ oriented reforms, designed to ensure more women are able 
to compete successfully for board appointments, and a quota, beginning modestly but 
increasing over time, which will be binding on listed companies as new board appointments 
are made.    
 To justify those recommendations, the article is structured as follows.  Part II is 
scene setting, examining the current state of play on board diversity within Mexico.  It 
shows the absence of any regulatory norms promoting diversity and provides more data on 
female board membership.  Part III asks why we should care about the lack of board 
diversity described in Part II.  Part IV turns to questions of strategy.  It notes a range of 
methods for improving diversity and draws lessons from the recent experience of six 
comparator countries.  Part V develops the suggestions for reform sketched out above, 
whilst Part VI concludes.   
 
II  Board Gender Diversity In Mexico 
A The Mexican corporate landscape  
Mexico offers a variety of different legal forms through which businesses may operate.  
About 90%4 of Mexican businesses are formed as ‘Stock Corporations’ (‘SA’).5  The SA has 
a flexible regulatory regime, and can be adapted for use by large and small enterprises 
alike.6  The majority of Sas, however, are micro, small, or medium-sized, companies.7   
They are usually controlled either by families or by closed groups of people, with all 
shareholders knowing each other.8  A 2014 study by the Business Family Foundation, for 
                                                     
3 Deloitte WB n.1, p.58. 
4 See Cecilia Cajiga, Deloitte México in Lucero Almanza, ‘Ven Desuso en Sociedades Mercantiles’ 
(2006) Grupo Reforma available at: <http://reforma.vlex.com.mx/vid/ven-desuso-sociedades-
mercantiles-194928871>  
5 The abbreviation for Sociedad Anónima, with which the SA’s name must end. Besides the SA, 
businesses can also use the limited liability company (whose name must end with Sociedad de 
Responsabilidad Limitada, or its abbreviation S.de R.L) or three types of partnership, namely the 
‘General Partnership’, the ‘Limited Liability Partnership’ and the ‘Limited Liability Stock Partnership’.   
6  The Limited Liability Company is falling into disuse in Mexico. Its perceived shortcomings include 
the limit on the size of its membership, which must not exceed 50, and restrictions on the transfer of 
ownership interests. See Guadarrama in Victor M Castrillón y Luna, ‘Ley General de Sociedades 
Mercantiles Comentada’ (8th edn, Editorial Porrúa 2016) p.57. 
7 They are usually collectively referred to as MIPYMES: Micro, Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas. 
8 Carlos A Gabuardi, ‘La Sociedad en Nombre Colectivo en Mexico’ (2014) Revista de Derecho 
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example, estimated that about 90% of Mexican businesses were controlled in this way, 
ranking Mexico fifth, globally, in terms of the proportion of family owned companies.9  This 
pattern of share-ownership usually means that there is not the degree of ‘separation between 
ownership and control’ that exists in, say, the UK or the US.10  The possible implications of 
this for board diversity will be addressed below.  First, however, we sketch out the current 
regulatory framework for board composition in Mexico.  
 
B The regulation of board composition in Mexico 
The law governing SAs is composed primarily of three sets of rules.  The first is the General 
Law of Commercial Companies, the Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles (‘LGSM’). 
This regulates the structure and operation of all business entities in Mexico. The second is 
the Securities Market Law, the Ley del Mercado de Valores (the ‘LMV’).  The third comes 
from Mexico’s Best Corporate Practices Code (‘the Code’).11  Whilst, taken together, this 
regulatory framework says something about both the role and the composition of boards, it 
remains almost entirely silent on the board’s gender balance.    
 
(i) The General Law of Commercial Companies (LGSM) 
We have noted already that one of the attractions of the SA lies in its flexibility.  Its 
approach to board composition illustrates this quality well.  The LGSM provides few rules 
governing the composition or membership of the board, and none of these rules addresses 
the gender of directors.  So, whilst Art.142 provides that management of the SA shall be 
entrusted to directors, it does not stipulate how many directors there should be, and the 
choice of directors is left entirely to the shareholders’ general meeting.12  The LGSM 
imposes no gender quota on the membership of the board, nor does it require, or even 
encourage, companies to take into account both women and men in the appointment of 
directors.  
                                                     
Privado III(5) UNAM, Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas, p.52. 
9 Oscar Santamaría from Business Family Foundation in Miguel A Pallares, ‘Mexico es el Quinto País 
con Más Empresas Familiares a Nivel Mundial’ (February 2014) El Financiero, available at: 
<http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/archivo/mexico-es-el-quinto-pais-con-mas-empresas-familiares-a-
nivel-mundial.html>  
10 Mathias Siems and David Cabrelli, Comparative Company Law, A Case-Based Approach (Hart 
Publishing Ltd, 2nd Ed., 2018) p.6. 
11 See below n.24. 
12 LGSM, Article 118. The only proviso is that if the company is to be managed by a board (rather than 
by a single director), then minority shareholders representing 25% of the capital stock have the right to 
select at least one director.  That percentage is reduced to 10% for companies that have registered their 




(ii) The Securities Market Law (LMV) 
The LMV was introduced in 2005, with the aim of improving standards of corporate 
governance in Mexico and thereby facilitating capital-raising by Mexican companies.13  It 
creates three sub-types of SA, which can be used by SAs at different stages in the cycle of 
attracting public investment. In addition to the relevant rules of the LMV, each of these three                                 
sub-types remains subject to regulation under the LGSM.14  
The Public Stock Corporation (‘SAB’)15 is the equivalent of a listed company, and is 
subject to the most onerous governance rules.  Alongside the SAB sit the ‘SAPI’’ and the 
‘SAPIB’.16  The SAPI is designed “to accommodate private equity investments, and serves 
as a transition from a closely held corporation into a publicly held company”.17  The SAPIB 
aims “to help medium-sized enterprises to obtain resources through the market, by offering 
the same rights as the SAB but with fewer reporting and corporate governance 
requirements.”18     
 For each of these three types of SA, the LMV lays down a number of rules relevant 
to the composition and functioning of their boards.  Each form must indeed have a board, 
and shareholders holding 10% of the voting shares19 may appoint and remove one board 
member.20  For SABs, the board must not exceed 21 members, of whom at least 25% must 
be ‘independent’.21  
Nothing in the LMV, however, regulates the gender balance of boards.  It does not 
stipulate that a board must contain any minimum number, or proportion, of directors of 
                                                     
13 For the stated goals of the LMV, see Article 1. 
14 LMV, Article 5. 
15 SAB stands for Sociedad Anónima Bursátil.  Most companies listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange 
are SABs.  
16 SAPI stands for Sociedad Anónima Promotora de Inversión whilst SAPIB stands for Sociedad 
Anónima Promotora de Inversión Bursatil. By Article 19, the SAPIB must adopt the form of a SAB 
within ten years of its incorporation. 
17 Dina Moreno and Jorge Montaño, ‘SAPIs to Promote Private Equity in Mexico’ (April 2006) 
International Financial Law Review, available at: <www.iflr.com/Article/1984607/SAPIs-to-promote-
private-equity-in-Mexico.html>  
18 Romina Román, ‘CNBV Modificará Regulación Para las SAPIB’ (February 2015) El Economista, 
available at: <http://eleconomista.com.mx/mercados-estadisticas/2015/02/09/cnbv-modificara-
regulacion-las-sapib>  
19 Whether individually or in aggregate and including limited or restricted voting rights. 
20 LMV, Article 16-I.  The threshold was decreased from 25% under the LGSM.  
21 LMV, Article 24.  For the SAPIB, only one independent board member is required: LMV, Article 
19-II.  For the SAPI, no independent board member is required: LMV, Article 15.  Independence is 




different genders, nor does it provide that the gender balance of the board as a whole should 
be a factor in appointing individual directors.   
It is worth pausing here to ask whether any other legal rules indirectly require 
directors to address the board’s gender diversity.  If companies are better served by having 
more diverse boards, for example, would not a director’s failure to ensure a diverse board 
constitute a breach of the duty of care directors owe to their company?  There are two inter-
related difficulties in trying to tease a requirement for board diversity out of a director’s duty 
of care.  First, although – as we shall see in Part III – there is much evidence suggesting that 
more diverse boards can outperform less diverse ones, the evidence is by no means 
unequivocal.  Second, according to the LMV, the members of the board of directors, when 
acting in good faith, shall not incur any liabilities “whenever they have chosen the most 
appropriate alternative, to the best of their knowledge and belief.”22 Thus, given current 
empirical uncertainties regarding the impact on a company’s performance of a more diverse 
board, it would seem easy for a director to argue that he considered, in good faith, and to the 
best of his knowledge and belief, that the board’s membership, although lacking in diversity, 
was appropriate for the company.23    
 
(iii) The Mexican Corporate Governance Code.  
The third source of rules regulating SAs is the Code of Principles and Best Practices 
of Corporate Governance (Código de Principios y Mejores Prácticas de Gobierno 
Corporativo) (‘the Code’).  First issued in 1999, by the Business Coordination 
Council (Consejo Coordinador Empresarial), its current version was published in 
2018.24  Although adherence to most of its provisions is voluntary, companies listed 
on the Mexican Stock Exchange must ‘comply or explain non-compliance’ with its 
                                                     
22 LMV Article 40-III. 
23  It would be different if a company had a policy of never appointing a female director. The first 
article of the Mexican Constitution prohibits discrimination by gender. Under the Federal Law to 
Prevent and Eliminate Discrimination, restricting opportunities of access, permanence and promotion 
of employment are regarded as discrimination; see Ley Federal Para Prevenir y Eliminar la 
Discriminación Article 9-III. And, under the Federal Labour Law, conditions that imply discrimination 
among workers due to gender are not permitted. See Ley Federal del Trabajo Article 3. 
24 The Code is available at: 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/codes/documents/codigo_digital_v20_f.pdf 
For a brief history of the Code’s genesis, and some aspects of its subsequent development, see OECD, 




recommendations, and some of its provisions are repeated as mandatory requirements 
in other statutory provisions.25 
The content of the latest version of the Code, like that of its predecessors, reflects 
many of the recommendations that have become familiar in similar codes around the 
world,26 with particular emphasis on the role, structure and composition of the board.   On 
the role of the board, it emphasises that this is not to manage the company, but instead to 
monitor and control those that do, as well as to define and develop the company’s strategic 
vision.27  On board structure, it recommends the creation of one or more board sub-
committees, composed of independent directors, and charged with supporting the full board 
in respect of certain key areas of governance.28  As to board composition, it recommends 
between three and fifteen members,29 and that at least 25% of the directors be ‘independent’ 
of management.30 Furthermore, the 2018 version of the Code notes, for the first time, the 
importance of including women on the board, to add to the diversity of the board’s 
knowledge and experience,31 and Best Practice recommendation 15 formally recommends 
the inclusion of women on the board.  However, no target is set, there are no 
recommendations that companies adopt policies to foster and achieve greater gender 
diversity, nor are companies required to report on progress in achieving any self-imposed 
target or policies.    
 
C Current practice regarding board composition in Mexico 
We have noted already that Mexico has a relatively concentrated ownership 
structure, with family-ownership predominating.  Board membership is often dominated by 
those families with controlling ownership.  It has been estimated that about 86% of small 
companies in Mexico have a controlling shareholder and 74% of those shareholders are also 
the directors of the company they control.32   
                                                     
25 See the Code, Introduction, p.9.  It was agreed that the different regulatory authorities could take 
from the Code what they considered should be mandatory for companies regulated under their 
competence area.  
26 Diego Martínez, ‘Corporate Governance 2016: México’ (9 December 2015) Latin Lawyer, available 
at: <http://latinlawyer.com/reference/topics/69/jurisdictions/16/mexico/> 
27 The Code, Chapter 2, p.12. 
28 Those areas are (i) Audit, (ii) Evaluation and Compensation, (iii) Finance and Planning and (iv) Risk 
and Compliance.  See Code, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.   
29 The Code, Chapter 4, Section 4.2, Best Practice recommendation 10. 
30 The Code, Chapter 4, Section 4.2, Best Practice recommendation 13. 
31 The Code, Section 4.2, discussion accompanying Best Practice recommendation 15. 
32 Carlos Simón and Mayra Gómez, ‘Encuesta a Empresas Familiares 2012’ (2013) PWC Mexico p.5. 
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Mexico also has one of the lowest rates of female representation on boards (or in 
senior management positions) in Latin America,33 with a lower proportion of female 
directors than Colombia, Chile, Brazil and Argentina.34  Although women account for an 
estimated 38% of the economically active population in Mexico,35 and one in four 
households has a woman as its head, their representation in the highest levels of 
organisations is minimal.36  
In companies listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange, women held a mere 5.7% of 
board positions in 2015, and just 6.9% by the middle of 2019.37  Moreover, in contrast to 
some other countries in Latin America,38 Mexico’s position has worsened over recent 
years.39  Women had held 7.6% of board positions in 2010.40  And although, according to a 
2016 survey, 90% of listed companies said gender diversity was relevant, only 8% said it 
was on their agenda to address.41   
 
III  Why Care About Board Gender Diversity? 
Does the paucity of female directors in Mexico matter?  Should we care about gender 
diversity on boards and, if so, why?  A large body of literature claims we should, and has 
relied on two main arguments.42  One is essentially a moral argument, and focuses on the 
intrinsic value of non-discriminatory treatment.  The other argument is consequentialist – 
that improving the gender balance of boards will produce desirable outcomes.  This has 
mostly (although not exclusively) focused on the consequential benefits for companies 
                                                     
33 Daniel Aguiñaga, ‘Diversidad en los Consejos de Administración’ (2014-2015) Deloitte Mexico, 
Boletín de Gobierno Corporativo, p.2.   
34 Egon Zehnder, ‘2016 Egon Zehnder Latin American Board Diversity Analysis’ (2016), p.3 available 
at: <www.egonzehnder.com/files/ez_latam-div-analysis_1.pdf>  
35 National Institute of Statistic and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía), 
‘Indicadores de Ocupación y Empleo al Primer Trimestre de 2016’ (2016) available at: 
<www3.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/temas/default.aspx?s=est&c=25433&t=1#> 
36 Carlos Méndez, et al.,‘6ta Encuesta de CEO en Mexico’ (2015) PWC-Mexico, p.22 available at: 
<www.pwc.com/mx/encuesta-ceo> 
37 Richard Kersley et al. ‘The CS Gender 3000 in 2019: The Changing Face of Companies (October 
2019) Credit Suisse, Research Institute, p.10, (hereafter ‘CS Gender’), available at: 
<https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us-news/en/articles/news-and-expertise/cs-gender-3000-report-
2019-201910.html>  
38 Colombia seems to have the highest levels of gender diversity on the boards of publicly traded 
companies in Latin America, with 14% of board seats held by women, in 2016; see Egon Zehnder n.34, 
p.3.  
39  Brazil increased from 5.7% in 2015 to 8.6% in 2019; see CS Gender, n.37, p.10.% between 2010 
and 2013.    
40 Julia Dawson et al. ‘The CS Gender 3000: The Reward for Change’ (September 2016) Credit Suisse, 
Research Institute, p.8. 
41 Zehnder n.34, p.5.   
42 For a useful overview of debates around boardroom diversity, see Lawrence J Trautman, ‘Corporate 
Boardroom Diversity: Why Are We Still Talking About This?’ (2015) 17 The Scholar 219.   
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themselves in having more diverse boards.  Because of this emphasis on corporate benefits, 
it is often labelled ‘the business case’ for boardroom diversity.   
We shall address both arguments below.  However, since both arguments (the moral, 
and the consequentialist) depend on what makes someone a good director, we begin by 
saying something about the competencies directors might need.    
 
A The competencies required of directors 
Such competencies will themselves depend on the role that directors should play.43  It is 
generally understood that boards are responsible for the ‘governance’ of their companies,44 
including developing the company’s long term strategic vision and holding accountable 
those managing the company.  Mexico’s Corporate Governance Code captures this oversight 
role of the board, recommending that the board should establish internal control and 
informational quality mechanisms, and appoint, and regularly evaluate the performance of, 
the chief executive officer and other senior management of the company.45  Linked to that, 
the board also has responsibility for ensuring the company’s compliance with relevant 
regulatory obligations.  
Besides these strategic and monitoring roles, much literature emphasises the 
contribution boards can also make to building up productive relationships with those – 
sometimes referred to as ‘stakeholders’ – who provide the resources on which a company 
depends.46  We should not read ‘resources’ too narrowly.  They include not only tangible 
inputs (raw materials, labour, credit, and so forth), but also more elusive assets, such as trust 
and goodwill.  Building good relations with, say, employees, consumers, or public regulators 
benefits the company and is a task to which board members can contribute.    
The literature is careful to distinguish the board’s governance and resource-
acquisition roles, on the one hand, from the role of managing the company, on the other.  
Management is the responsibility of executives, not of the board as a whole.  Of course, 
some directors will also be executives of the company, and for them, their role will include 
                                                     
43 See Daniel Ferreira, ‘Board Diversity’ in Ronald Anderson and H. Kent Baker (eds.) ‘Board 
Diversity’ in Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, Research, and Practice (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2010).  
44 See e.g. Renée B Adams, Benjamin E Hermanlin and Michael S Weisbach, ‘The Role of Boards of 
Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey’ (2010) 48 J. of Econ. Lit. 
58, p.64. 
45 See Code, Best Practice recommendation 8.   
46 For a good introduction to this ‘resource dependency theory’ of the board’s role, see Amy J Hillman 
et al., ‘The Resource Dependence Role of Corporate Directors: Strategic Adaptation of Board 
Composition in Response to Environmental Change’ (2000) 37 J. of Management Studies 235. 
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not only participation in the board’s collective responsibility for governance and resource-
acquisition, but also carrying out those senior managerial activities that arise from their 
executive position.    
Having described the functions directors must perform, it becomes possible to begin 
to identify the competencies directors should ideally possess if they are to perform these 
functions effectively.  In the UK, for example, the Institute of Directors divides them into 
three groups: a body of knowledge, a set of skills, and the ‘mind sets’ or attitudes that 
directors require.47  The Australian Institute of Company Directors offers a finer sub-
division, talking of experience, knowledge, skills, attitudes, values and beliefs.48   
The merits of gender diversity will depend upon how we think these competencies 
are likely distributed amongst the population as a whole.  One possibility is that the 
distribution of directorial competencies is ‘ungendered’, in the sense that there is no 
correlation between a person’s gender and their possession of directorial competencies.  Any 
particular directorial skill, knowledge, or attitude is just as likely to be possessed by a 
woman as by a man.  Unfortunately, this seems implausible, and for at least two reasons.   
First, as we have seen, directorial competencies include relevant experience.  Yet 
Mexican women still occupy – and thus gain experience of – fewer of the mid- and higher-
level executive positions within companies from which directors are often being selected.  
This may be due, in part at least, to gender discrimination in the recruitment to those 
positions.  And this under-representation of women at sub-board level may require separate 
attention, both as a matter of concern in its own right and as a contributing factor to a lack of 
gender diversity at board level.   
The second reason explains why so much of the debate focuses specifically on 
‘diversity’ – on ensuring that each individual board has a mix of both genders.  For there 
may be some directorial competencies where women tend to outperform men (and vice 
versa).  This is, of course, controversial, and risks invoking uncomfortable stereotypes,49 yet 
it is supported by a sizeable body of literature.50  One reason why this might be so should, in 
                                                     
47 IOD, Professional Development 2016/17 available at: 
<https://www.iod.com/Portals/0/PDFs/Training/IoD-Professional-Development-Portfolio-2016-
2017.pdf?ver=2016-09-28-100806-000> 
48 See Australian Institute of Directors, Key competencies for directors, available online at: 
<http://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/~/media/cd2/resources/director-resources/director-
tools/pdf/05446-2-mem-director-tools-bc-key-competencies-directors_a4_web.ashx.>   
49 See Eleanore Hickman, ‘Boardroom Gender Diversity: A Behavioural Economics Analysis’ (2014) 
14 J. of Corp.Law Studies 385, pp.388-9. 
50 See eg Kim Daehyun and Laura T Starks, ‘Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards: Do Women 
Contribute Unique Skills?’ (2016) 106 The American Economic Review 267, p.270; Renée B Adams, 
‘Women on boards: the superheroes of tomorrow?’ (2016) 27 The Leadership Quarterly 371; Ioanna 
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fact, be relatively uncontentious.  Women directors seem particularly well-equipped to 
enhance a company’s reputation for gender equality.51  The same point applies, as Fairfax 
notes, to the company’s compliance with equality regulation.52  And other writers have 
emphasised the importance of the board’s diversity in ensuring its legitimacy in the eyes of 
external stakeholders.53 
It has also been argued that women may, on average, also possess some attitudinal 
advantages over men.54  Women may be more inclusive and ‘collegial’ in their style of 
discussing and debating within (board) meetings.  They may be more independent minded, 
less prone to the problem of ‘group think’ which can undermine collective board decision 
making, and less likely to engage in excessive risk-taking.55 To the extent that such 
advantages do hold for women, then they can help to offset the ‘experiential’ disadvantage 
that women suffer.   
 
B Two reasons for caring about board diversity 
Returning now to our earlier question: why should we care about board diversity?  Turning 
first to the moral argument, the concern is that a lack of women directors may evidence 
discrimination.  If the imbalance, across a large number of companies, in the number of male 
and female directors cannot be justified by differences in their competencies, this suggests 
some directors were selected or rejected not according to their competencies, but rather 
according to their gender.   
It is important to stress that concern about discrimination does not depend on 
competencies being distributed in an ungendered way.  Even if women do, for example, 
score less well in terms of relevant experience, one should still ask whether the disparity in 
                                                     
Boulouta, ‘Hidden Connections: The Link Between Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Social 
Performance’ (2013) 113 J. of Business Ethics 185. 
51  See Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers, ‘Female Directors on Corporate Boards Provide Legitimacy to a 
Company: A Resource Dependency Perspective’ (May 2009) Management Online Review pp.1-13. 
Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1411693> 
52 Lisa M Fairfax, ‘The bottom line on board diversity: a cost-benefit analysis of the business rationales 
for diversity on corporate boards’ (2005) Wisc. Law. Rev. 795, pp.825-828. Fairfax refers to this as the 
‘litigation rationale’ for board diversity.   
53  See e.g. Elise Perrault, ‘Why Does Board Gender Diversity Matter and How Do We Get There? The 
Role of Shareholder Activism in Deinstitutionalizing Old Boys’ Networks’ (2015) 128 J. of Business 
Ethics 149.   
54 For useful overviews of some of the relevant literature here, see Adams n.50;Sandeep Gopalan and 
Katherine Watson, ‘An agency theoretical approach to corporate board diversity’ (2015) 52 San Diego 
L.Rev. 1. 
55 Brad M Barber and Terrance Odean, ‘Boys will be boys: gender, overconfidence, and common stock 
investment’ (2001) 116 Q.J. of Econ. 261; James P Byrnes, David C Miller and William D Schafer, 
‘Gender differences in risk taking: a meta-analysis’ (1999) 125 Psychol. Bull. 367. 
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the number of male and female directors was no more than one would expect given the 
different experience levels of men and women.  And if women do indeed score better on 
some competencies than men, then this should again cause a still greater narrowing in the 
gap between the number of male and female directors.56  
One advantage of the moral argument in addressing a lack of gender diversity is that 
it does not depend on empirical evidence proving that a more diverse board will cause 
companies to be more successful.57  Discrimination against women is morally objectionable, 
and addressing it does not require proof that it will be in companies’ own interests to tackle 
such discrimination.58  This advantage should not be underestimated for, as we shall see 
below, there are difficulties in showing empirically that companies do indeed benefit from 
more diverse boards.   
Nevertheless, a disadvantage in relying on the moral argument is that it may carry 
too little weight with companies themselves.  From a strategic point of view, then, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that much of the debate59 has tended to focus on the ‘business case’ for 
board diversity.60  Part of the business case is that companies with homogenous boards are 
not utilising the best talent available.  This, clearly, overlaps with the moral argument.  
Discrimination, which leads companies to appoint less suitable men ahead of more suitable 
women, not only infringes women’s moral rights, but harms companies too.   
Note again that ‘getting the best talent’ means getting the best mix of directorial 
competencies.  Doing so should ensure directors who perform better individually, and who 
also improve the collective performance of the board.61  The board, as an institution, should 
                                                     
56 If competencies are distributed in a gendered way we would expect each individual board to be more 
gender-balanced.  In a board with, say, currently a predominance of male directors, the competencies 
that one will likely be looking for in the next appointment are, all other things being equal, likely to be 
those disproportionately possessed by women.   
57 James A Fanto, Lawrence M Solan and John M Darley, ‘Justifying Board Diversity’ (2011) 89 North 
Carolina L. Rev. 901. 
58 Marc McCann and Sally Wheeler, ‘Gender Diversity in the FTSE 100: The Business Case Claim 
Explored’ (2011) 38 J. of Law and Society 542. 
59 For arguments to this effect, see for example Hema A Krishnan and Daewoo Park, ‘A Few Good 
Women On Top Management Teams’ (2005) 58(12) J. of Business Research 1712; Theresa Welbourne, 
‘Wall Street Likes its Women: An Examination of Women in the Top Management Teams of Initial 
Public Offerings’ (1999) WP 99-07 CAHRS, Cornell University 11; Mary Curtis, Christine Schmid and 
Marion Struber, ‘Gender Diversity and Corporate Performance’ (August 2012) Credit Suisse, Research 
Institute, pp.15-17. 
60 For similar analysis in relation to diversity and discrimination in the legal profession, see Clare 
McGlynn, ‘Strategies for Reforming the English Solicitors’ Profession: An Analysis of the Business 
Case for Sex Equality’ in Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw (eds) Women in the World’s Legal 
Professions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003).   
61 See Bernali Choudhury, ‘New Rationales for Women on Boards’ (2014) 34 Oxford J. Legal Studies 
511, p.521.  
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fulfil its roles more effectively if it encompasses a diverse mix of directorial competencies.62  
Hillman notes that “when groups are able to consider more options, generated by having a 
more diverse set of perspectives, their solutions are better”.63  To be sure, a more diverse 
board may generate more conflict between its members than one that is more homogenous,64 
and this might sometimes lengthen proceedings and slow decision-making.65  But the gain is 
that boardroom debates can be enriched by the different perspectives that different genders 
bring to bear.66  If women are indeed better at avoiding ‘group think’, and at fostering a 
more collegial and inclusive approach to collective discussions, then the board’s own 
deliberations should improve.  Some studies have suggested that women are more 
“participatory and democratic than men and tend to adopt a more critical attitude”,67 are 
“less likely to have attendance problems”,68  and are often “better prepared for meetings and 
ask more questions”.69   
A more mixed board should also be better at building relationships with 
thosestakeholders who care about the company’s commitment to gender equality.  And, at 
least in those companies where a more cautious attitude towards risk might be appropriate, 
the greater risk aversion that some research suggests female directors exhibit may also be an 
advantage to the company.70  Finally, Chen et al. suggest that more gender-diverse boards 
tend to achieve ‘greater innovative success’, making diverse boards especially valuable 
where ‘innovation and creativity play a particularly important role’.71   
                                                     
62 Kim and Starks n.50, p.270. 
63 Amy J Hillman, ‘Board Diversity: Beginning to Unpeel the Onion’ (2015) 23(2) Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 104.  See also Katrin Sier and Astrid Carniaux, 2014 Egon 
Zehnder European Board Diversity Analysis (Egon Zehnder, 2014) p.3. 
64 See Tailor H Cox and Stacy Blake, ‘Managing Cultural Diversity: Implications for Organizational 
Competitiveness’ (1991) 5:3 Academy of Management Executive 45. 
65 See Isabel Gallego Alvarez et al., ‘The Influence of Gender Diversity on Corporate Performance’, 
(2010) 13(1) Spanish Accounting Review 81. 
66 Nada K. Kakabadse et al., ‘Gender Diversity and Board Performance: Women's Experiences and 
Perspectives’ (2015) 54(2) Human Resource Management 276.  
67 Ibid  p.269.  On the other hand, it is has been suggested that if female directors tend to be more 
critical, this could lead to a degree of ‘over-monitoring’ of executive performance: see Renée B Adams 
and Daniel Ferreira, ‘Women in the Boardroom and their Impact on Governance and Performance’ 
(2009) 94(2) Journal of Financial Economics 291. 
68 Renée B Adams and Daniel Ferreira, ibid. p.292. 
69 Mareva Sabatier, ‘A women’s boom in the boardroom: effects on performance?’ (2015) 47(26) 
Applied Economics 2717, p.2718. 
70 See Vathunyoo Sila, Angélica González and Jens Hagendorff, ‘Women on Board: Does boardroom 
gender diversity really affect firm risk?’ (2016) 36 Journal of Corp.Finance 26.  Álvarez argues that 
Spanish companies in which women hold more than 40% of board seats have a lower credit risk: María 
Álvarez, ‘Las Mujeres en los Consejos de Administración y Organismos de Decisión de las Empresas’ 
(February 2015) Informa D&B, p.3. 
71 See Jie Chen, Woon S Leung and Kevin P Evans, ‘Board Gender Diversity, Innovation and Firm 




So far, we have focused on the beneficial consequences accruing to companies 
themselves.  But having more female directors should also generate wider social benefits.  It 
should help to empower women more generally.  It shows that women can reach the highest 
levels within companies, and in doing so also swells the pool72 both of positive role models 
for women and of potential mentors for aspiring female managers and directors.73 It has also 
been argued that female directors have a positive influence on a company’s corporate social 
responsibility (“CSR”) practices,74 and may help to moderate excessive executive pay, 
thereby reducing salary differentials and thus inequality within companies.75   
To be sure, some of these social gains may also benefit any individual company 
which helps to deliver them.  Enhancing a company’s reputation for adhering to good CSR 
practices may build positive and beneficial relationships with that company’s stakeholders.76  
Curtailing excessive executive pay within a company helps both to control agency costs and 
to reduce discontent amongst other workers within that company.77  But these social 
consequences have value in their own right; improvements they deliver to the performance 
of a company that introduces them are a happy coincidence.    
One apparent difficulty that proponents of gender diversity face is supporting their 
arguments with empirical evidence.  The empirical evidence (about the effects of greater 
diversity) is complex and far from unequivocally supportive.78  Gallego et al. for example, 
note that ‘[c]ompanies with higher levels of gender diversity will not clearly obtain better 
performance’,79 whilst Daunfeldt found no connection between greater gender diversity and 
firm performance.80 It is doubtful, however, whether this lack of strong empirical support is 
in any sense destructive of the case for gender diversity, and for at least two reasons.   First, 
such evidence is primarily relevant to the business case for gender diversity.  Even if such 
                                                     
72  Many of these social benefits depend not on the proportion of each company’s board members that 
are female, but on the total number of women that are directors.     
73 Lissa L Broome, John M Conley and Kimberly D Krawiec, ‘Dangerous categories: narratives of 
corporate board diversity’ (2011) 89 N. Carolina L.Rev. 759. 
74 Beatríz Cuadrado Ballesteros et al., ‘Efecto de la Composición del Consejo de Administración en las 
Prácticas de Responsabilidad Social Corporativa’ (2005) 18(1) Spanish Accounting Review 28. 
75 See e.g. Adams and Ferreira n.67, p.303, who observe that ‘the proportion of female directors is 
associated with more equity-based pay for directors’.  
76 Stephen Bear, Noushi Rahman and Corinne Post, ‘The Impact of Board Diversity and Gender 
Composition on Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Reputation’ (2010) 97(2) J. of Business 
Ethics 217; Alvarez et al., n.65, p.58. 
77 John Shields et al., ‘The Bucks Stop Here: Private Sector Executive Remuneration in Australia’ (7 
April 2014) Report for the Labour Council of NSW 14. 
78 See generally Choudhury n.61. 
79 Alvarez et al., n.65, p.81.   
80 Steven-Olov Daunfeldt and Niklas Rudholm, ‘Does Gender Diversity in the Boardroom Improve 
Firm Performance?’ (2012) 60 HUI Research 24. 
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evidence showed that diverse boards do not improve corporate performance, such would not 
disprove the claim that board diversity can bring wider social benefits – such as increasing 
the number of positive role models for women.  Nor would a lack of evidence supporting the 
business case undermine the moral argument for equal treatment.  
  Second, even if the empirical evidence does not clearly prove that companies are 
better-off with more diverse boards, equally nor does it clearly disprove that.  It does not 
show that gender imbalanced boards generate superior corporate performance.  Given that, it 
might be argued, it is appropriate to put weight on the theoretical arguments advanced in 
favour of board diversity.  If, in the future, the empirical evidence begins to show, clearly 
and consistently, that companies suffer significant harm as a result of having more diverse 
boards, then the theoretical arguments will have to be reassessed.   
 
IV   Strategies Addressing Gender Diversity  
A Regulatory strategies 
Much of the debate about how to improve boardroom gender diversity has focused on 
gender quotas.  We turn to that shortly.  First, however, it is worth noting that much might 
be done to improve gender diversity through measures addressing the ‘process’ through 
which directors come to be  appointed, rather than specifying particular ‘outcomes’ (such as 
the percentage of women directors that boards are required, or encouraged, to appoint). So, 
process changes may be introduced to reduce the barriers preventing women gaining the 
competencies necessary to compete on equal terms with men for directorial appointments.   
Changes in education practices, in companies’ own recruitment and promotion practices at 
sub-board level, in better promoting positive role models for aspirant female business 
leaders, and so on, can all help.  Likewise, improvements might also focus on companies’ 
own director-selection methods, to ensure recruitment is indeed competency based (rather 
than reflecting, for example, the conscious or unconscious bias of the recruiter). 
Since process measures undoubtedly address the reasons we think gender diversity 
matters in the first place, why might we move beyond process  and focus instead on 
outcomes – on measures that specify proportions of men and women to be appointed?  The 
answer lies very largely in the limited effectiveness of process-oriented measures.  Changes 
to the social environment that might constrain women’s ability to compete for board 
positions can be slow to achieve, and may have less impact on board diversity than expected 
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or hoped for.81  Likewise, there are difficulties in policing reforms that address companies’ 
own board-recruitment processes, which are often hidden from external scrutiny.  And, even 
when those processes can be made transparent to outsiders, boards’ recruitment choices 
involve an element of business judgement, which is notoriously difficult to review and to 
challenge.  Similarly, whilst improving the pipeline of talented female candidates for board 
positions seems a better way of ensuring equality of opportunity, it is harder to encourage 
more women to try if too few women appear to have succeeded.  Imposing outcome targets 
can be one – perhaps short-term – measure to break this vicious circle.   
Instead of addressing processes, then, reform might instead focus on outcomes, using 
norms that specify the gender balance that boards should have.  A range of outcome-focused 
norms might be introduced, varying both in how precisely the requisite outcome (the desired 
gender balance) is defined, and in how mandatory compliance is.  However, discussion here 
tends to revolve around a choice between voluntary targets and mandatory quotas.  
To be sure, the use of any outcome norm is itself controversial.  First, such norms 
might themselves lead to discrimination against men, where a less qualified woman is 
appointed in order to satisfy the norm.  The magnitude of this problem is difficult to assess, 
however.  For whilst such discrimination might sometimes occur, it would have to be 
balanced against all those cases where better qualified women, who would not have been 
chosen in the absence of the norm, are now appointed because of it.82  The second criticism 
of outcome norms is about their consequences.  The main concern is that they harm the 
economic performance of companies that are subject to them, insofar as they lead to less 
well-qualified board appointments.  The empirical evidence – which has mainly focused on 
the impact of quotas – is, however, unclear.83  Studies may give different results depending 
on the way they measure firm performance, and the time scale over which the consequences 
of such quotas are measured.  The latter point may be especially important if, as seems 
plausible, there is a sizeable time-lag between the introduction of a quota and the 
improvements a quota produces in the supply of well-qualified female candidates.  Effects 
                                                     
81 See eg Joanna Tyrowicz, Siri Terjesen and Jakub Mazurek, ‘All on board? New evidence on board 
gender diversity from a large panel of European firms’ European Management Journal (in press, 
available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2020.01.001); Nina Smith, ‘Gender quotas on boards of 
directors’ (2018) IZA World of Labor, doi: 10.15185/izawol.7.v2. However, compare Sudheer Reddy 
and Aditya Mohan Jadhav, ‘Gender diversity in boardrooms – A literature review’ (2019) 7 Cogent 
Economics & Finance, Issue 1.  
82 See Siri Terjesen and Ruth Sealy, ‘Board Gender Quotas: Exploring Ethical Tensions From A Multi-
Theoretical Perspective’ (2016) 26 Bus. Ethics Quarterly 23, pp.33-34.  
83 For an overview of the evidence, see Smith n.81.   
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on firm performance may also vary from country to country, depending on factors peculiar 
to that country.   
We will consider some of these criticisms further in our analysis of a range of 
countries’ experiences below.  However, and as our analysis of comparator countries also 
shows,84 despite concerns about the use of outcome norms, the most compelling argument in 
their favour is their strategic effectiveness in accelerating improvements in diversity.  And 
this seems to be especially true in respect of the use of quotas.    
 
B Six comparator country experiences  
 
(i) Norway 
Norway stands out as being the first country to introduce a legally enforceable gender quota.  
The so-called ‘quota law’ was passed by the Norwegian Parliament in December 2003.85   
The quota applies to public limited companies, and varies according to the number of 
directors on the board.  If, for example, the board has more than nine directors, each gender 
must be represented by at least 40% of the members.86 Initially, the quota was introduced on 
a discretionary basis, but produced fewer changes in board membership than expected.87  
With effect from 2008, the quota became mandatory, requiring listed companies to have at 
least a 40/60 gender balance.88  The sanctions for non-compliance include liquidation of the 
company,89 although liquidation may be avoided where the government considers the firm 
particularly important for society.90  And whilst some have described the quota law as ‘one 
of the most extreme measures undertaken,’91 no company has yet faced dissolution for non-
compliance.  
                                                     
84 For a broader, but less detailed, overview of OECD countries’ practices with regards to the use of 
targets and quotas on gender diversity, see OECD, n.2, pp.131-134. 
85 Øyvind Bøhren and Siv Staubo, ‘Does Mandatory Gender Balance Work? Changing Organizational 
Form To Avoid Board Upheaval’ (2014) 28 Journal of Corporate Finance 152. 
86 Deloitte WB n.1, p.135. 
87 See for example Sweigart, who argues that, despite the discretionary norm, ‘firms overall achieved 
little progress in female board membership’; Anne Sweigart, ‘Women on Board for Change: The 
Norway Model of Boardroom Quotas As a Tool For Progress in the United States and Canada’ (2012) 
32(4) Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 83A.   
88 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,‘Sharing Norway’s experience with gender quotas for 
boards’ (October 2017), available at: < https://www.norway.no/en/missions/eu/about-the-
mission/news-events-statements/news2/sharing-norways-experience-with-gender-quotas-for-boards/> 
89 See Bøhren and Staubo, n.85.   
90 Ibid, p.154. 
91 Curtis et al. n.59, p.23. 
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Norway’s introduction of a mandatory quota has not received universal acclaim.  
One concern has been a tendency for a small number of women – so-called ‘golden skirts’ – 
to accumulate multiple board appointments.  The benefits of greater boardroom diversity 
have, accordingly, spread less widely than intended.92 A second concern has been that the 
law, which only applies to public limited companies, has stimulated ineffecient avoidance 
behaviour by companies.  So, Bøhren and Staubo93 suggested that up to half of those 
companies subject to the quota (public limited companies, or ‘ASAs’) chose to change their 
status to become an ‘AS’ (closer to the private limited company).  Presumably, avoidance of 
the quota aside, such companies changed to a form that was otherwise sub-optimal for them.  
 A third concern relates to the quota’s impact on the performance of Norwegian firms.  
Ahern and Dittmar, for example, argued that the quota had had ‘a large negative impact on . 
. . firm value’ amongst a panel of 248 Norwegian publicly listed companies.94  However, 
later research suggested that any adverse effects were much more limited.95  Moreover, the 
effectiveness of the quota in achieving its basic objective of increasing gender diversity 
within individual companies has been widely noted.96  In 2002 women held a mere 6% of 
board seats in Norwegian public companies.97 This had risen to 36.6% by 2010,98 to 40.3% 
by 201799 and reached 42.5% in March 2019.100  Moreover, as Seierstad and Huse 
emphasise, the benefits of the law can be seen not only in Norway’s own increasing board 
diversity, but in the readiness of other countries to use quotas to secure diversity 
improvements.101   
 
(ii) France 
One such country is France  which has followed Norway’s approach by introducing its own 
                                                     
92 Paul Lansing and Sitara Chandra ‘Quota Systems as a Means to Promote Women into Corporate 
Boardrooms’ (2012) 38 Employee Relations L J 3, p.5.  
93 See n.85. 
94 Kenneth Ahern and Amy Dittmar, ‘The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of 
Mandated Female Board Representation’ (2012) 127 Quarterly Journal of Economics 137.   
95 See eg B. Espen Eckbo et al, ‘Board Gender-Balancing and Firm Value’ ECGI Finance Working 
Paper No. 463/2016 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2746786 
96 For an overview of relevant literature examining the results of the Norwegian law, see Cathrine 
Seierstad and Morten Huse, ‘Gender Quotas on Corporate Boards in Norway: Ten Years Later and 
Lessons Learned’ in Cathrine Seierstad, Patricia Gabaldon and Heike Mensi-Klarbach (eds) Gender 
Diversity in the Boardroom: Volume 1 (Palgrave, 2017). 
97 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.88. 
98 Dawson n.40, p.8. 
99 CS Gender, n.37, p.10. 
100 Statistik sentralbyrå, ‘Board and Management in Limited Companies’ (March 2019), available at: 
<https://www.ssb.no/en/virksomheter-foretak-og-regnskap/statistikker/styre/aar> 
101 See n.96. 
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quota law102 ‘ensuring a minimum level of female representation in boardrooms’.103  The 
Copé-Zimmermann Law introduced a boardroom quota in 2011, and this was reinforced in 
2014 by the Gender Equality Law.104 France effectively adopted a two-stage timetable.  By 
January 2014, all listed companies, and some other larger companies,105 had to have 20% 
female board membership.106  This rose to 40% by January 2017.107  The quotas are 
mandatory; ‘nominations [will] be void and fees suspended for all board members’ until the 
lack of gender diversity is resolved.108  
 Again, the use of quotas seems to have been effective.109  In 2004 women held just 
6% of board positions.  This more than doubled, to 12.4%, by 2010 and more than doubled 
again to 28.5% by 2014.110  Thus, stage one (20% by January 2014) was met two years 
before the deadline. Stage 2 was met by 2017, when women were estimated as occupying 
42.5% of French boardroom seats.111 By  2018, that figure had increased to 44.4%, placing 
France first, globally, in the proportion of female directors..112  For Zenou et al,113 the 
improvements in board diversity were largely a product of the mandatory force of the quota 
requirement, which helped to nullify much of the opposition that might otherwise have 
resisted change.   
 
(iii) Germany 
In March 2015, Germany also enacted a gender quota for some supervisory boards.114  This 
law requires publicly listed companies, with equal employee co-determination,115 to ensure 
                                                     
102 On motives – both ethical and economic – for the law’s introduction, see Sabatier, n.69, p.2724. 
103 Tim Wimborne, ‘France Sets Quota for Women on Big Companies' Boards’ (January 2011) 
Reuters. 
104 See Deloitte WB n.1, p.102; and Emmanuel Zenou and Bénédicte Brullebaut, ‘Gender Diversity on 
French Boards: Example of a Success from a Hard Law’ in Seierstad et al n.96.   
105 i.e. those with at least 500 employees (or, from January 2020, 250 employees) and revenues over 
€50,000,000. 
106 CCRE, ‘The Quota-Instrument: Different Approaches Across Europe’, (European Commission’s 
Network to Promote Women in Decision-making in Politics and the Economy, WP, April 26, 2010), 
p12. 
107 Deloitte WB, n.1, p.102. 
108 Curtis et al. n.59, p.25. 
109 See Zenou et al, n.119. 
110 Sier and Carniaux, n.64, p.14. 
111 CS Gender, n.37, p.10. 
112 Ibid. 
113 See n.119, pp.116-117. 
114 Article 1.4 of the Gesetz für die gleichberechtigte Teilhabe von Frauen und Männern an 
Führungspositionen became effective in January 2016.  For the background to, and detail of, the 
German quota, see Alexandra Fedorets et al, ‘Gender Quotas in the Boardroom: New Evidence from 
Germany’ (2019) DIW Discussion Papers 1810, available at http://www.diw.de/discussionpapers 
115 ie companies whose supervisory boards must have an equal number of employee and shareholder 
representatives.  These are the approximately 100 largest listed companies.   
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at least 30% female membership of their non-executive supervisory boards.116  The 
requirement applies as new board appointments are made.  So, when a company subject to 
the quota is appointing a new director, if that company is currently below the 30% 
requirement, then it must appoint a woman.  The principal sanction for non-compliance is 
that any appointment made in breach of the foregoing is treated as void, and the board 
position is treated as still vacant.117  This will not prevent the board from functioning, but 
‘may do some reputational damage, but only at companies that are in the public eye’.118  The 
statutory provision is buttressed by the German Corporate Governance Code, which since 
2015119 has included recommendations on setting targets for the promotion of gender 
diversity on management and supervisory boards.120  
Contrary to concerns raised in other countries about the impact of quotas on firm 
performance, the study carried out by Fedorets et al did not establish any significant 
negative effect of the quota on firm profitability.121  And although the limited sanction 
attaching to the German quota provisions has led some to doubt their impact,122 the law 
seems nevertheless to have been relatively successful in improving supervisory board 
diversity.  In 2008, women held only 7.8% of boardroom positions in Germany.123 Although 
this increased to 23% by 2012, it fell again to 21% by 2014 and remained at that level during 
2015.124 However, after the implementation of the quota, female representation increased 
from 26.7% in 2016, to 29.4% during 2018, reaching the 30% target set on supervisory 
boards by 2019 with 32.4% of female representation.125   
It is true that the position has  been less encouraging on management boards  There, 
evidence suggests that the proportion of female directors barely increased, from 6.5% in 
                                                     
116  A larger group of approximately 3,500 companies (those which are either listed or subject to co-
determination) must also publish their own self-selected targets for improving board diversity.  
117 Caroline Copley, “German Parliament Approves Legal Quotas for Women on Company Boards” 
(Berlin, 2015) Reuters, available at: < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-women-
quotas/german-parliament-approves-legal-quotas-for-women-on-company-boards-
idUSKBN0M214S20150306> 
118 Susanne Amann et. al, ‘The Slow Pace of Gender Equality in Corporate Germany’, (Germany, 
January 06, 2016) Spiegel, available at < http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-firms-
slowly-adjust-to-new-boardroom-quota-law-a-1070622.html> 
119 And effective as of January 2016. 
120 Deloitte WB n.1, p106. 
121 See Fedorets et al, n.115. 
122 Renuka Rayasam, ‘Why Germany's New Quota for Women On Boards Looks Like a Bust’ Fortune 
(March 11, 2016) available at: < http://fortune.com/2016/03/11/germany-board-quota-women/> 
123 Daniel Costa-Roberts, ‘German Parliament Passes Gender Quota for Corporate Boards’ (March 7, 
2015), PBS. 
124 Dawson n.40, p.8. 
125 CS Gender, n.37, p.10. 
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2016126 to 8% by 2017, increasing by an additional 1% by the end 2018127 and remained at 
9% during 2019,128 showing little improvement on a very low starting point.  But 
management boards are not covered by the quota law: the limited improvements achieved 
for them, compared to those realised in supervisory boards, seems to support, rather than 
undermine, the effectiveness of quotas.   
 
(iv) United Kingdom 
In contrast to the other countries analysed so far, the UK government has refused to set a 
legislative quota.  Instead, the UK’s approach has been more exhortative.  In 2010 the 
Government set up its Women on Boards review, chaired by Lord Davies, to look at how 
obstacles to increasing the number of women directors might be removed.  In its first 
substantive Report, the Davies Review recommended that FTSE 100 companies129 achieve a 
minimum of 25% female representation by 2015.130  In 2015, this target was updated, 
recommending that all FTSE 350 companies meet a voluntary target of 33% female 
directors by 2020.131  
The recommendations of the Davies Review were also reflected in changes to the 
UK Corporate Governance Code.  In 2016, it was amended to provide that ‘the search for 
board candidates should be conducted, and appointments made, on merit, against objective 
criteria and with due regard for the benefits of diversity on the board, including gender’.132 
In addition, it now recommends that there be a ‘formal, rigorous and transparent procedure’ 
for the appointment of new directors.133  These recommendations are enforced on a ‘comply 
or explain’ basis.   
                                                     
126 DW Akademie, “Estudio: Solo 7.3 Por Ciento de Mujeres Dirigen Empresas en Alemania” 
(January 2018), available at: <http://www.dw.com/es/estudio-solo-73-por-ciento-de-mujeres-dirigen-
empresas-en-alemania/a-42083349> 
127 Elke Holst and Katharina Wrohlich, ‘Increasing Number of Women on Supervisory Boards of 
Major Companies in Germany; Executive Boards Still Dominated by Men’(January 2019) DIW Berlin 
(vol.9) p19, available <https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.612031.de/dwr-19-
03-1.pdf>  
128 Martina Schmid et al., ‘Board Diversity in Germany & the UK – What Works’ (November 8, 2019) 
German British Forum, available at: <http://www.gbf.com/board-diversity-in-germany-the-uk-what-
works/> 
129 That is, the 100 largest companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
130 Davies Review, Women on Boards (2011) Recommendation 1, p18; available at 
https://ftsewomenleaders.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/women-on-boards-review.pdf 
131 Davies Review, Improving the Gender Balance on British Boards: Five Year Summary (2015) p7; 
available at: https://ftsewomenleaders.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Davies-Review-Five-year-
Summary-Oct-2015.pdf  
132 UK Corporate Governance Code (April 2016), B:2. 
133 See now UK Corporate Governance Code (2018), Principle J.  The current version is available at: 
https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-governance-and-stewardship/uk-corporate-governance-code      
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 Although the UK has chosen recommended targets in place of mandatory quotas, the 
level of change achieved has nevertheless been significant.  According to the Davies 
Review’s own Five Year Summary Report,134 the proportion of women directors in FTSE 
100 companies increased from just 12.5% in 2011 to 26.1% by October 2015, and reached 
30.6% by 2019.135  Thus, the 25% target set by the Davies Review was achieved, and on a 
voluntary basis. As for FTSE 250 companies, the proportion of female directors increased 
from 7.8% in 2011 to 19.6% by October 2015,136 reaching 27.5% by November 2018.137   
In November 2016, the Hampton-Alexander Review was launched, to continue the 
work begun by the Davies Review.138  Like its predecessor, the Hampton-Alexander Review 
is also seeking to use ‘soft’ (non-legally enforceable) targets to encourage listed companies 
to improve board diversity.  In its first report, published in 2016, it urged FTSE 350 
companies to have women occupying a least 1/3 of board positions by the end of 2020.139   
By November 2018, it was reported that over 30% of board appointments across FTSE 350 
companies were women.140   
Whilst the UK has undoubtedly achieved a good deal of progress, and has done so 
through merely voluntary targets, it is worth noting that the targets set – 25% by the end of 
2015, and 33% by 2020 – are more modest than those achieved for other countries.  Norway 
and France, as noted above, have each used quotas to set, and achieve, targets of 40%.  
Moreover, much of the progress has been achieved by increasing the number of female non-
executives. For instance, the percentage increased from 33.7% by 2016 to 43.2% by 2018 
and 52.7% by 2019.141  The gender imbalance amongst executive directors remains 
substantially greater, ‘leaving the executive board to continue to be dominated by men’,142  
In 2015, for example, only 8.6% of executive directors of FTSE 100 companies were 
                                                     
134 n.146.   
135 Spencer Stuart, ‘2019 UK Spencer Stuart Board Index’ (2019), p13, available at: 
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136 Ibid.  
137 Ben Chapman, ‘UK Firms Set to Fall Short of Government Targets for Women on Boards’ (July 1, 
2019) The Independent, available: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/women-on-
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138 For the work and output of the Hampton-Alexander Review, see generally: 
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139 See Hampton-Alexander Review: FTSE Women Leaders (November, 2016) available at: 
https://ftsewomenleaders.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/FINAL-HA-Review-Nov-2016.pdf 
140 Hampton-Alexander Review: FTSE Women Leaders (November, 2018) available at: 
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141 Spencer Stuart, n.136, p.17 
142 Julia Kollewe and Shane Hickey, ‘A Third of Boardroom Positions Should Be Held By Women, 
UK Firms Told’, (October 29, 2015) The Telegraph. 
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women, increasing to 9.8% by 2017 and to 10.9% by June 2019.143 However, that figure fell 
to a mere 4.6% in FTSE 250 companies by 2015, which increased to 7.7% by 2017 and to 
8.4% by 2019.144  The lack of progress in improving diversity amongst executive directors 
in the UK was examined and criticised in a report by the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, which also noted that some of the increases in the proportion of women 




Until comparatively recently, Spain had a very low rate of female representation in corporate 
boards.146 In 2003, for example, only 3% of board seats were held by women.147 In response, 
board diversity has been addressed both in Spain’s corporate governance code, and through 
a legislative target.  
The Gender Equality Act of 2007148 introduced a (voluntary) gender target of 40% 
female board representation, for large and listed companies, to be achieved by 2015.   Other 
companies with more than 250 employees must present an ‘equality plan’ for achieving 
equal treatment between women and men.149 Although, as noted, the 40% gender target is 
not mandatory, “the lack of diversity will be considered when State contracts and subsidies 
are awarded”.150   
Buttressing the voluntary target found in the 2007 Act are the provisions of Spain’s 
corporate governance code.  In 2006, the Spanish government introduced the Unified Good 
Governance Code of Listed Companies, with the purpose of improving corporate 
                                                     
143 Susan Vinnicombe et al.,‘The FTSE Board Report 2019’ Cranfield University (2019) p.10, 
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145 See Equality and Human Rights Commission, An inquiry into fairness, transparency and diversity in 
FTSE 350 board appointments (2017) available at: 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/ehrc_inquiry_ftd_ftse350_updated_22-4-
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146 Kevin Campbell and Antonio Mínguez-Vera, ‘Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm 
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governance and the management of Spanish companies.151  Rule 14 of the Code’s current 
version provides that “by 2020, companies are expected to have at least 30 percent of board 
seats reserved for women” and a proper explanation for non-compliance must be 
provided.152  However, the Code’s provisions are, as is typical, enforced only on a ‘comply 
or explain’ basis. 
Female representation on Spanish corporate boards has undoubtedly improved.153  In 
2010, the proportion of board seats held by women was a mere 10.3%,154 but this had 
increased to 13.7% by 2013, to 18.5% by 2016, and to 23.8% by October 2019.155  
Nevertheless, it has been noted that in 2019, six major companies listed in the Spanish 
Exchange Index (IBEX 35) had no women on their boardrooms and only five companies had 
a 30% female representation.156 Izquierdo has estimated that it could take 14 years to reach 
gender parity on listed companies’ boards.157  Palá-Laguna and Esteban-Salvador emphasise 
the lack of effective enforcement behind the Spanish recommendations.158  The pressures on 
companies to follow and implement the provisions of Spain’s corporate governance code are 
too weak to procure effective change, they note, with ‘few reputational consequences for 
Spanish listed companies that do not comply’.159  
 
(vi) The USA 
In 2018, California became the first US state to require companies to have female 
representation at the board seats of public companies based in such state.160 The law 
applies to any publicly traded corporation (regardless of its place of incorporation) that 
has ‘principal executive offices’ located in California.  Such companies were required 
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160 California, Senate Bill No. 826, Chapter 954 (September 30, 2018), 301.3(a) 
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to have at least one female director by 2019.  From 2021, the minimum number 
increases: for five-person boards, there must be at least two female directors, and for 
board of six or more persons, at least three female directors.161  
Apart from California, it is perhaps surprising to learn that there are currently no 
legislative instruments setting a target, or quota, for female boardroom representation in 
other US states. As Wiersema and Mors note, ‘the US is now among the few Western 
developed economies with neither voluntary nor mandatory targets’.162  On the other hand, 
the US does have a number of organisations championing boardroom gender balance. 
Examples include the ‘Thirty Percent Coalition’163 and ‘2020 Women on Boards.’164 
Notwithstanding that, US boards have historically been more diverse than those of some of 
the other countries addressed here.  In 2010, women held 12.7% of board seats, increasing to 
13.7% in 2013 and 16.6% during 2015.165 Moreover, the boards of the largest companies – 
the S&P 500 – were even more diverse.  By the end of 2015, 19.9% of directors of such 
companies were women, 166 increasing to 22% by 2018.167  Moreover, 14.2% of those 
companies were approaching gender parity, with more than 30% female representation.168  
By October 2019, the percentage of women directors had increased to 24.1%.169    
 
V  Reform Suggestions for Mexico 
Any attempt to offer a route-map for improving board diversity in a particular country must 
take account of the reasons why that country has suffered a lack of diversity. Section A 
addresses some of those, whilst section B suggests a number of measures which ought to be 
taken in response.  
 
A Why so little board diversity in Mexico? 
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Many factors, no doubt, have contributed towards Mexico’s historically low rate of female 
board membership.  Four in particular deserve emphasis.   
First, what might be termed ‘sociocultural factors’ undoubtedly play a role.170  These 
encompass cultural views and practices concerning the proper role of women in Mexican 
society generally, and within the workplace in particular.  Although there have been 
improvements in gender equality generally in Mexico, a number of factors continue to drive 
inequality between men and women. They include some educational policies, the influence 
of religious institutions, and the “machismo” that permeates Mexican society.171 In a survey 
carried out by the Strategic Communications Office in 2016, 61.2% of 600 interviewees 
considered Mexican society to be characterised by a macho culture,172 which includes the 
belief that men are superior to women.173  These sociocultural factors may well, consciously 
or unconsciously, influence selection committees that are appointing new board members.  
However, the problem goes much deeper.  It influences the career expectations that are 
communicated to different genders from childhood, the educational opportunities each 
gender enjoys, the assignment of family (and especially child-care) responsibilities outside 
of the workplace, and so on.  All these undoubtedly affect the ‘pipeline’ of qualified women 
in sub-board level managerial positions in Mexico.   
The second factor contributing towards Mexico’s historical lack of boardroom 
diversity arises from its peculiarly concentrated, and family-oriented, share ownership 
patterns.174  Corporate controllers likely often see themselves, or members of their family, as 
the most appropriate directors for the company.  To put this in the language used in Part III, 
in such companies ‘being the controller, or a member of the controlling family’ will count as 
the primary ‘competence’ which any director should have. In order to ensure that the 
                                                     
170 See generally Amalia Carrasco, Claude Francoeur, Réal Labelle, Joaquina Laffarga and 
Emiliano Ruiz-Barbadillo, ‘Appointing Women to Boards: Is There a Cultural Bias?’ 
(2015) 129 Journal of Business Ethics 429. 
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business stays in the family, shareholders will sometimes be willing to sacrifice the 
possibility of hiring professionals with experience and expertise in the field, for the 
appointment of less well-qualified family members.  Of course, this of itself need not lead to 
a propensity to appoint men rather than women to be the directors of such companies.  If 
women were just as likely as men to set up, and enjoy control over, companies, then a 
propensity for controllers to appoint themselves would produce no gender bias against 
female directors.  However, when viewed in the light of Mexico’s cultural background, 
matters change.  For controllers are indeed more likely to be male, an imbalance that feeds 
through into boardroom appointments.  And whilst ‘family members’ of the controller could 
encompass women as much as men, cultural attitudes are likely to ensure that the family 
members appointed to the board are more likely to be sons or brothers than daughters or 
sisters.   
The above points are reinforced by the fact that stronger corporate governance 
policies tend to be implemented in larger companies (which are less likely to be family 
dominated), and this seems to be true in Mexico too.  A 2015 survey by PWC of 145 
directors of Mexican companies found that 66% had implemented diversity strategies, 17% 
were planning to do so and only 13% were not planning to have one.175  
 The third factor is the relative absence, or weaker influence, of Mexican 
organisations advocating for greater board diversity.  The only example of such an 
organisation in Mexico is the recently176 opened ‘chapter’ of Women Corporate Directors 
(WCD), a US not-for-profit that aims to increase female board representation.177 Beyond 
this, there are no others with the specific purpose of increasing female board membership.  
 Finally, a historical lack of diversity is likely to be somewhat self-perpetuating.  The 
fewer women who already hold board seats, the harder it is to encourage companies to 
appoint more.  With fewer existing female directors, prospective female appointees have 
fewer role models to emulate, or mentors to offer support.  The lack of female directors can 
reinforce (or, at least, less often challenge) existing gender stereotypes amongst those 
recruiting new board members.   As Sabatier notes, “recruiting female directors is not a 
random process but rather a result of a corporate strategy implemented over the long run.”178 
But with fewer existing women on boards, companies’ existing strategies and policies are 
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less likely to include a commitment to gender diversity.  
 
B Proposals for reform 
We shall argue, below, that the imposition of a binding quota is appropriate for Mexico.  
However, first, we should note that the ‘process’ reforms we identified above ought also to 
be adopted.  As we have seen, some of the factors which contribute to Mexico’s gender 
imbalanced boards concern deeper aspects of Mexico’s culture, and will require broader 
policies directed towards achieving equality of opportunity between genders.  Addressing 
female opportunities in education, for example, in sharing responsibility for care of children 
or family members, or in recruitment and promotion to sub-board level appointments,179 can 
all help to address the ‘pipeline’ problem noted above.  Policies that support and help female 
entrepreneurs should mean more female controlled companies and, as a by-product, more 
female directors, and so on.  
Likewise, the process of companies’ own recruitment should be addressed too.  So, 
for all SAs we suggest non-binding recommendations of good corporate practice,180 
emphasising the importance of recruiting by reference to candidates’ competencies, rather 
than their gender.  Such recommendations would also emphasise the value in achieving the 
mix of competencies that a diverse board encompasses, and the importance of transparency 
in the recruitment process, so that companies’ observance of these principles would be open 
to scrutiny.   
However, for SABs,181 we would go further.  First, the proposed reforms to the 
recruitment process should be added to Mexico’s Code of Principles and Best Practices of 
Corporate Governance.182  Second, and more significantly, SABs should be subject to a 
quota requirement.  This should be set at an admittedly modest level in the first instance but 
should, as has occurred in many other countries, be increased over time.  Three principal 
issues arise here.   
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The first is: why choose a quota, rather than a voluntary target?  The reason lies 
primarily in the superior effectiveness of quotas, as evidenced by the analysis of other 
countries’ experience.  We accept that gender quotas suffer the disadvantage of a ‘one size 
fits all’ approach. But the severity of this loss of ‘flexibility’ depends in part upon how 
demanding, or how modest, is the quota that is being applied.  And it is outweighed, we 
would argue, by the clear compliance advantages which a mandatory quota is likely to enjoy 
in Mexico.     
It is true that some countries – the UK and the USA are notable examples – have 
achieved, without resort to quotas, higher levels of board diversity than Mexico enjoys.  But 
we regard those countries’ success as a poor guide to what Mexico might achieve with a 
similar reliance on voluntary targets.  Both countries have stronger support for board 
diversity amongst voluntary and campaigning organisations.  Both countries have different 
patterns of share ownership, with a greater separation of ownership and control, and more 
powerful institutional investors adding to the pressure for diversity.  And both countries start 
from a position already significantly ahead of Mexico.   
The second issue is: what quota?  The quota itself should, as in the German system, 
apply on the occasion of new board appointments.  An SAB that fell below the required 
proportion of female directors would have to fill its next board appointment with a female 
director.  As to the required proportion, a multi-stage timetable could be adopted, similar to 
that in France. The aim should be to increase the proportion of female directors 
incrementally, over a period of time. Given Mexico’s historically low starting point, we 
would suggest a target in the region of 15% to be achieved within, say, a period of five 
years.  The second stage target could be set provisionally at say somewhere between 25% 
and 30%, to be reached within 10 years.  However, both could be subject to review during 
the first stage, based on companies’ experiences in complying with the first target.    
The third issue is: how mandatory?  What sanctions should apply for non-
compliance with the specified quota? We suggest two, intended to influence both the general 
shareholders meeting and the existing directors.  First, and as in the German system, an 
appointment of a male director made in breach of the quota would be void.  Shareholders, 
presumably, would not want their boards to be subject to such ‘empty chairs’, nor the 
validity of their decisions to be open to question.  Second, the fees of existing board 
members should be suspended where a (male) director is appointed in breach of the quota. In 
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this sense, the existing directors will pressure the general shareholders meeting to achieve a 
diverse board with a mix of competencies and, therefore, act in accordance with the law.183  
 
VI  Conclusions 
Board diversity matters.  Its absence suggests women are suffering discrimination as they 
compete for board appointments, whilst companies and societies are better off when their 
boards are more diverse.  But extolling the virtues of board diversity is one thing; offering a 
persuasive strategy to achieve it is quite another.  This article has sought to do that.   
The core of the strategy is a combination of process reforms – to ensure women have 
equal opportunities as they seek to rise to the top of the companies they serve – with a 
realistic quota.  The latter would be applied in two stages, to give companies chance to 
adjust to its demands, and would be mandatory.  All SABs would have to comply with it as 
they make new board appointments.  If the experience of countries such as Norway and 
France are revealing, then they suggest that such quotas work well to achieve significant – 
and comparatively rapid – improvements.   
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